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ABSTRACT
International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood
through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract
theory that explain the vertical organization of production. The combination of trade with the choice
of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research.
This survey paper provides a perspective on this new literature so as to gain insights into the forces
driving international outsourcing. The paper focuses on relationship-specific investment, incomplete
contracts, and also search and matching, as fundamental concepts that explain outsourcing decisions.
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barbara.spencer@sauder.ubc.ca1As reported by Amiti and Wei (2005), there were 2,634 articles in US newspapers on service
outsourcing alone, just in the first five months of 2004. However, the outsourcing of business services is
still quite small (about 0.4% of GDP in 1995). 
2See Campa and Goldberg (1997) and also Feenstra and Hanson (2001). Other evidence can be
found in Yeats (2001), Feenstra (1998) and Yi (2003). 
3Particularly for developing countries, the share of processing exports to the US based on data
from the “US Offshore Assembly Program” is sensitive to cost (Swenson, 2005). 
4I am grateful to Robert C. Feenstra for the data. 
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1. Introduction
The rising volume of imports from low wage countries, such as China and India, has fueled
public concern in the United States and other high-wage countries that jobs will be lost and wages
eroded.
1 A growing segment of this trade, and in world trade more generally, has been in
intermediate inputs, such as components and equipment. For example, from 1974 to 1993, imports
as a share of total purchases of electrical equipment and machinery rose from 4.5% to 11.6 % in the
United States and 13.2% to 30.9% in Canada.
2 As explained by Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001)and
Yi (2003), there has been a growth in the vertical fragmentation of production leading to a vertical
supply chain stretching over more than one country. Intermediate inputs are exported to a country,
processed and then re-exported perhaps for further processing in another country.
A common motive is to reduce costs through production in low wage countries.
3 Figure 1
shows the enormous growth of manufacturing exports from China for the period 1988 to 2003.
4
Manufacturing exports are categorized as either processing exports (the sum of the black and grey
areas) or ordinary exports (the white area). Processing exports are goods that have been produced
using imported inputs, such as raw materials or specialized parts supplied by a foreign manufacturer.
Manufacturing exports from China rose from $39 billion to $398 billion US, but processing exports5There are various, sometimes contradictory, definitions of outsourcing in the literature. The term
is used here to indicate the procurement of inputs outside the firm (either through a contractual
arrangement or a spot market) as opposed to vertically integrated production. The term encompasses both
domestic and foreign purchases. The latter purchases are referred to as international outsourcing. 
4

















FIE Processing Export Other Processing Export Ordinary Export
grew even more rapidly from 35% of manufacturing exports in 1988 to 57% in 2003. The black area
of each bar in Figure 1 represents the value of processing exports due to FIE’s (Foreign Invested
Enterprises), which are wholly foreign owned enterprises or equity joint ventures with at least 25%
foreign ownership. The grey area represents processing exports that can be characterized as arising
from outsourcing contracts between foreign buyers and independent Chinese firms.
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Figure 1: The Growth of Chinese Manufacturing Exports ($US), 1988-2003
The growing importance of the international procurement of intermediate inputs either
through outsourcing or within the firm, through foreign direct investment, cannot be explained by
traditional trade theories that abstract from vertical fragmentation and contractual relationships
between buyers and suppliers. Consequently, researchers have been motivated to enrich international6The literature also addresses other issues such as the formation of multinational firms. An
important paper is Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2005). Globalization increases wage inequality
in the South due to the formation of cross- country teams involving Northern managers and Southern
workers (multinationals). See Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a survey of the trade and wages literature. 
7Incomplete contracts can arise due to unforeseen contingencies, the excessive cost of
specification of a large number of contingencies or the inability of the courts to enforce the contract.
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trade theory with concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the
organizational form of the firm. The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form
represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research. The objective of this
survey paper is to provide a perspective on this growing literature so as to gain insight into the forces
driving international outsourcing.
6 
Relationship-specific investment, incomplete contracts and also search and matching are
fundamental concepts that help explain outsourcing decisions.
7 In this context, an outsourcing
contract is incomplete if a supplier undertakes relationship-specific investment so as to specialize
production to the needs of a buyer or vice versa, but contracts cannot be written conditional on the
level of investment. For example, if a Chinese supplier can sell its processed goods only to the
particular buyer that provided the inputs, then the supplier’s investment in this production can be
viewed as relationship-specific. If is it not possible to specify this level of investment in the contract,
then the outsourcing contract is incomplete. The importance of search and matching arises from the
idea that independent (non-integrated) final-good producers need to match with a suitable supplier
of a specialized input for production to take place. 
The literature mostly draws from various models of the boundary of the firm to explain the
decision to contract out the provision of a specialized input rather than produce under vertical
integration. A second branch of the literature assumes that the alternative to an outsourcing contract8Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985) emphasize that when uncertainty and asset
specificity are high, transaction costs are reduced by giving one party control over both sides of a
transaction within a hierarchical firm rather than operating through the market.
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for a specialized input is to buy a standard or generic version of the input through a spot market
transaction. The literature also differs as to whether international outsourcing is driven by lower
foreign costs or by some other difference across countries, such as the quality of legal institutions.
In the next section, I use these different modeling approaches to devise an overview and
classification of the papers to be discussed. The organization and outline of the paper is provided
at the end of the section.
2. Overview and Classification of papers
In classifying papers, I use four theories of the boundary of the firm: property rights,
transaction costs, incentive systems, and delegation of authority. The property rights theory of
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) defines a firm as a set of assets under
common ownership or control. The theory emphasizes that regardless of ownership structure,
relationship-specific investment is distorted due to the hold-up problem arising from the inability
to fully reward investment under incomplete contracts. This applies to investment or effort by
managers within the firm as well as outsourcing contracts. Ownership and control should be
allocated so as to minimize the loss in surplus due to investment distortions. 
Under the earlier transaction cost approach, the boundary of the firm is determined so as to
minimize transaction costs.
8 At the extreme, integration eliminates transaction costs leading to
efficient levels of investment within the firm. In the context of international trade models, an
important determinant of transactions costs is the thickness of the market. A thicker market increases9Details differ across papers, but for unintegrated final-good producers, the market is thicker if
there is a greater chance of a match with a supplier that meets its technological requirements. Conversely,
markets are thicker for suppliers if there are more potential buyers of their input. 
10The fact that principal-agent contracts cannot be written conditional on unobserved effort levels
suggests that the contracts are incomplete. However, Hart (1995, pp 20-23) argues that the contracts are
“comprehensive”: the distortion in effort is due to the cost of observing variables rather than the inability
to write contracts and there is no need for renegotiation since all future obligations are specified.
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the ease with which an independent final-good producer can match with a producer of a specialized
input and hence reduces the advantage of vertical integration over outsourcing.
9 
A further possibility is an incentive systems approach in which a principal designs optimal
contracts to induce effort by managers under costly monitoring.
10 The greater ease of monitoring
within the firm favors vertical integration over outsourcing. Finally, since formal delegation of
authority by a principal to an agent can be interpreted as an outsourcing decision, the theory of
delegation of authority due to Aghion and Tirole (1997) represents an extension of property rights
theory that is relevant for the literature on trade and organizational form. However, since the efforts
of the principal and agent are directed at obtaining information so as to decide between competing
“projects”, this approach is valuable for understanding the roles of information and knowledge
creation for vertical organizational form and power within the corporation rather than the best way
to procure specialized intermediate inputs.
The papers selected for detailed consideration are classified in Table 1 into a number of
boxes according to various options for procurement as determined by organizational form and
theoretical approach (columns) and the geographic source of intermediate inputs or components
(rows). As shown in the Legend of Table 1, the papers are organized into five groups, which are
discussed in detail below. Each paper is denoted by the initials of the last names of their authors
followed by a two digit specification of the year in brackets and can appear in multiple categories.8
     Organizational      
             forms





















 (A) Domestic 
 A(05), AH(04) MV(02,05*) SQ(01)  A(05), AH(04)
 M(00)  PT(02)  GH(02,04,05)
 GH(02,04)    SQ(01), QS(02)
HRS(04)*,FS(05)*
(B) Integrated world  
economy
,A(03)*, M(00) , MV(03) A(03)*, N(05)*
 L(04)*
(C) Foreign at lower 
cost
 A(05), AH(04)    SQ(01) A(05), AH(04)
GH(04), FH(03b)*   ,QS(02) GH(04,05)
 FS(05)*  HRS(04)* FH(03b)*,FS(05)*
 FS(05)*
Legend: Group 1: Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs & Helpman (2004), Grossman & Helpman (2004),
Feenstra and Hanson (2003b), denoted by A(03)*, A(05), AH(04), GH(04) and FH(03b)*. 
Group 2: McLaren (2000), Grossman & Helpman (2002,2005), denoted by M(00) and GH(02,05).
Group 3: Spencer & Qiu (2001), Qiu & Spencer (2002), Head, Ries & Spencer (2004), 
Feenstra & Spencer (2005), denoted by SQ(01), QS(02), HRS(04)* and FS(05)*. 
Group 4: Levchenko (2004), Nunn (2005), denoted by L(04)* and N(05)*. 
Group 5: Puga and Trefler (2002), Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003, 2005), denoted by PT(02) and
MV(02,03, 05). An asterix denotes empirical analysis.
Table 1: Options for Procurement
Papers identified with an asterix include empirical analysis.
As shown by the columns of Table 1, an intermediate input or component can be produced
within a vertically integrated firm or can be purchased through outsourcing. Vertical integration is
split into two categories depending on the underlying theory. Papers in column 1 take a property
rights, transaction costs or incentive systems approach to vertical integration. Papers based on the
theory of delegation of authority are listed separately in column 2, because of their different focus.9
The table also shows two categories of outsourcing: a spot market transaction for a generic version
of an intermediate input in column 3 or a contract for a specialized intermediate input in column 4.
The rows of Table 1 specify the location of input production as domestic (row A), in an
integrated world economy where factor costs, such as wages, are equalized across countries (row
B) or as foreign at lower cost (row C). Although aggregate international outsourcing may be
determinate for papers in row B, individual firms may be indifferent, making it indeterminate as to
whether any particular firm outsources abroad. Identifying boxes in the table by the row letter
followed by the column number, papers in box C1 involve FDI (foreign direct investment) since they
combine vertical integration with foreign production.
For ease of discussion, the papers are organized into five groups, roughly categorized as to
topic. The five papers in the first group, Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Grossman
and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2003b), all address the choice between vertical
integration (column 1) and the purchase of a specialized input through contractual outsourcing
(column 4). A(03*, 05) and AH(04) take a property rights approach which they embed into general
equilibrium models of trade. Comparison is made with the incentive systems approach taken by
GH(04). Using export processing data from China, FH(03b)* contrasts both these approaches.
A(05), AH(04) and GH(04) are listed in the four boxes, A1, A4, C1, C4, indicating that firms can
choose between vertical integration and contractual outsourcing and also between domestic and
foreign production. A(03)* includes empirical analysis (as shown by the asterix) and appears in B1
and B4 due to its modeling of an integrated world economy. Since FH(03b)* abstracts from the
possibility of domestic production of the input, it is listed in boxes, C1 and C4.
  The papers in the second group, namely McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman11There is also a literature concerning international outsourcing under imperfect competition, but
incomplete contracts are not considered. See for example, Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Ishikawa and
Spencer (1999), and Chen, Ishikawa and Yu (2004). Friedman and Fung (1996) examine the effects of
trade on the prevalence of US type and Japanese type firms. 
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(2002,2005),  all examine the outsourcing of specialized input taking into account general
equilibrium effects arising from the thickness of the market. These papers take a transactions cost
approach in which vertical integration removes distortions in managerial effort. Outsourcing
contracts are incomplete in GH(02) and GH(05) (column 4), whereas the outsourcing in M(00)
involves bidding rather than contracting. Both GH(02) and M(00) consider the tradeoff with vertical
integration (column1). GH(02) is listed in boxes, A1 and A4 due to its purely domestic context, but
since M(00) considers the integration of multiple markets, it is listed in A1 and B1. By contrast,
GH(05) models domestic versus international contractual outsourcing, but not vertical integration
and appears in boxes A4 and C4.
Prior to consideration of incomplete contracts, arms length international outsourcing between
unrelated parties mostly assumed perfectly competitive markets.
11 Spencer and Qiu (2001), Qiu and
Spencer (2002), Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) and Feenstra and Spencer (2005), represent a third
group of papers that bridges these two literatures by endogenizing the choice between specialized
components produced under incomplete contracts (column 4) and generic components purchased
from a spot market (column 3). The papers take a partial equilibrium approach in which a final-good
firm procures a continuum of parts or components. All parts are outsourced, but since it is the
suppliers that invest in specializing the components, not the final-good firm, the property rights
approach would suggest outsourcing rather than vertical integration. All four papers, SQ(01),
QS(02), HRS(04)* and FS(05)*, are listed in boxes A4 and C3 due to analysis of domestic
contractual outsourcing and the import of lower-cost generic inputs. Since a range of generic parts11
is produced domestically, SQ(01) also appears in A3. Since FS(05)* extends the theory to
international contractual outsourcing and FDI by component suppliers, it is listed in C1 and C4.
  Levchenko (2004) and Nunn (2005), denoted by L(04)* and N(05)* respectively, are
discussed in a fourth group of papers concerned with country-specific institutional differences that
affect the quality of contract enforcement and hence the pattern of trade in contract intensive goods.
Since L(04)* and N(05)* both assume an integrated world economy and do not address the choice
between vertical integration and outsourcing, they are listed only in B4. 
Finally, Puga and Trefler (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003, 2005), form a fifth
group that draws on the theory of delegation of authority to consider the choice between control by
a principal and outsourcing. However, since the papers are not concerned with contracts for an
intermediate good, they are included only in column 2. Analysis of an integrated world economy
leads MV(03) to be listed in boxes A2 and B2. MV(02, 05*) address international integration, but
do not explicitly model trade.
Papers in groups 1 to 5 are discussed in separate sections. Section 3 concerns the choice
between vertical integration under the property rights or incentive systems approach (column 1) and
contractual outsourcing (column 4). Section 4 concerns the implications of the thickness of the
market. Before moving to the more applied papers in sections 6 and 7, section 5 discusses the
practical requirements for customs and payment on delivery. Section 6 focuses on the choice
between generic and contractual outsourcing (columns 3 and 4), whereas section 7 involves the role
of institutions and contract enforcement (column 4). Discussion of the theory of delegation of
authority (column 2) is deferred to section 8. Finally, section 9 concludes by discussing “where are
we now and where should we go?”.12Suppose parties A and B with bargaining powers, " $ 0 and 1-" $ 0 respectively bargain over
the value of x, which could represent a lump-sum payment or a price per unit. Letting B
i(x) and B
i0
represent party i’s utility from agreement and threat point (utility from no agreement) respectively, the








i (x) - B
i0 is party i’s surplus from agreement. The solution satisfies a number
of axioms such as independence from the scale in which utility is measured. Under ordinary Nash
bargaining, the parties share equally (" = $ = ½). As shown by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski (1986),
this solution has a foundation in non-cooperative bargaining theory.
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3. Vertical integration versus outsourcing: Property rights/incentive systems
  The five papers in group 1 are considered in two subsections. Antràs (2003, 2005) and Antràs
and Helpman (2004) are considered in 3.1, which focuses on the tradeoff between vertical
integration and international outsourcing under the property rights approach. Section 3.2 provides
a comparison with the incentive systems approach based on Grossman and Helpman (2004) and
Feenstra and Hanson (2003b). 
3.1. Vertical integration versus international outsourcing: property rights
Under the property rights approach, relationship-specific investments are distorted because
enforceable agreements take place only ex-post or after investment is sunk. The surplus or economic
rent created by the relationship is distributed through ex-post Nash bargaining
12. The ownership of
assets is fundamental for each party’s incentive to invest, since it determines the residual rights of
control and hence the “outside option” or “threat point” of each party. Grossman and Hart (1986)
emphasize that ownership and control should be allocated so as to minimize the loss in surplus due
to investment distortions. Thus if two agents each make an investment relevant to a different
dimension of the business, ownership should be given to just one of the agents (vertical integration),
or the two dimensions of the business should be separated (non-integration or outsourcing),
depending on which arrangement minimizes the loss in surplus. Generally the agent that is most
important in raising surplus should gain ownership rather than operate as a manager. 13
Hart and Moore (1990) add the idea that workers, as well as management, contribute to the
productivity of an asset and that a key right provided by ownership is the ability to exclude people
from the use of assets. Under integration or ownership, workers can be selectively fired, whereas
if an outsourcing contract breaks down, unintegrated firms lose the entire benefit from the assets
owned by the other party. The incentive for a principal to choose vertical integration is increased
by the more favorable outside option.
A major achievement of the new literature has been to embed contracting models into the
standard general equilibrium models that explain trade based on differences in endowments of
factors across countries and monopolistic competition arising from consumer demand for variety.
Antràs (2003) develops a property-rights model of the boundaries of the firm and embeds it into a
general equilibrium monopolistic competition model of trade in which countries differ in their
endowments of labor and capital. Antràs and Helpman (2004) introduce heterogeneity or dispersion
in the productivity of final-good firms as pioneered by Melitz (2003), but abstract from differences
in factor proportions. Antràs (2005) combines incomplete international outsourcing contracts with
a dynamic general equilibrium of trade so as to explain the development of product cycles in which
new goods are initially designed and produced in the North, with later production moving to the
South. These contributions are explored in more detail in the rest of the section. 
Antràs (2003) provides evidence that capital-intensive intermediate goods, such as chemical
products, tend to be imported into the US within the boundaries of multinational firms, while labor-
intensive goods, such as textiles, are imported from unaffiliated parties. Also, the share of intrafirm
imports by multinationals as a proportion of total U.S. imports is higher, the higher the capital-labor
ratio in the exporting country. Thus U.S. imports from capital abundant countries, such as14
Switzerland, tend to involve multinationals, whereas imports from capital scarce countries, such as
Egypt, occur mostly at arms length. To explain these results, Antràs (2003) assumes a continuum
of varieties of final goods in each of two sectors, which differ by capital intensity due to a
requirement for a specialized intermediate input produced with both capital and labor. The opening
of trade leads to an integrated world economy in which factor prices are equalized as in Helpman
and Krugman (1985), but since final-goods are assumed to be non-tradeable, the entire volume of
world trade is in intermediate inputs. 
The costs of production of specialized inputs are non contractible and hence are sunk prior
to ex-post Nash bargaining as to each party’s share in the relationship. Vertical integration and
capital intensity are linked by assuming that final-good producers can alleviate the hold-up problem
by contributing capital up-front so as to aid in the production of the specialized input. Such cost
sharing could involve the provision of specialized tools and equipment and pre-financing of capital
expenses. If cost-sharing is large enough, then it is efficient to assign the residual rights of control
to the final-good producer leading to vertical integration. Conversely, the model predicts outsourcing
if the contribution of the final-good producer is relatively minor. Cost sharing and the attractiveness
of vertical integration is shown to be increasing in the capital intensity of intermediate-good
production with the result that final-goods in the capital intensive sector are produced under vertical
integration, whereas those in the labor-intensive sector are outsourced. The model predicts that for
any pair of countries, the share of a country’s intrafirm imports is an increasing function of the
capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.
In Antràs and Helpman (2004), final-good firms make a random draw as to their productivity
level and decide whether to produce only after paying a fixed cost of entry. Unlike Antràs (2003),15
wages are lower in the South than the North and labor is the only factor of production. Final goods
are produced in the North using headquarter services from the North as well as manufactured
components, which can be produced in the North or the South.
Since all production costs are assumed to be relationship-specific, following the property
rights approach to the firm, the revenues from sale of the final-good are allocated to final-good firms
and manufacturers of components (whether of not they are vertically integrated) on the basis of ex-
post Nash bargaining after all costs of production are sunk. In accordance with Hart and Moore
(1990), final-good producers have a better outside option and hence a larger share of revenue under
vertical integration than outsourcing due to the ability to fire the manufacturer and seize some
fraction of components. However, aggregate revenue is reduced by the weaker incentive for
component production within the firm. The choice of organizational form depends on the importance
of headquarter services, which varies by sector. In sectors with high headquarter’s intensity, the
property rights approach suggests vertical integration so as to motivate final-good firms to supply
these services. Otherwise, outsourcing is the preferred organizational form since it increases the
incentive for component production. 
In addition to the fixed cost of entry, final-good producers incur fixed organizational costs
that vary with organizational form. Fixed costs are higher in the South than in the North, potentially
offsetting the lower marginal costs in the South. Also, within any country, vertical integration
involves higher fixed costs than outsourcing. Since greater productivity increases the benefit from
low cost production, it is the more productive firms within the sector that choose to pay the higher
fixed cost of production in the South. Also, since higher productivity is associated with increased
revenue, more productive firms are also willing to pay the higher fixed cost of vertical integration13Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) develop a related model in which the fixed
organizational cost of integration is less than the fixed cost of outsourcing. The most productive firms 
outsource in the South and the least productive vertically integrate in the North. The paper identifies
conditions under which outsourcing and foreign sourcing are positively correlated.   
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so as to obtain a greater share of that revenue. 
Figure 2 illustrates the four organizational forms that arise if headquarter intensity is
sufficient to induce vertical integration. As shown in the column under AH(04), the most productive
firms vertically integrate and produce via FDI in the South, the next most productive outsource in
the South, lower productivity firms vertically integrate in the North, even lower productivity firms
outsource in the North and the least productive exit. The ranking from highest to lowest productivity
corresponds to the ranking from highest to lowest fixed cost.
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Figure 2: Organizational form and Productivity Rank 
The prevalence of each type of organizational form is shown to depend on a number of
parameters, such as headquarter’s intensity and the degree of productivity dispersion across firms.
In particular, a reduction in transport costs or a lower Southern wage causes some of the lower17
productivity firms that previously produced through vertical integration in the North to switch to
outsourcing contracts in the South. This result is particularly interesting in the light of the argument,
often presented in the media, that outsourcing has increased due to a reduction in the cost of doing
business in the South.
Antràs (2005) develops a dynamic general equilibrium Ricardian model of North-South trade
in which the incompleteness of international contracts leads to the emergence of product cycles.
Northern firms produce goods by combining a hi-tech input or R&D from the North with a low-tech
input, capturing simple assembly or manufacturing. The low-tech input can be produced either
through vertically integration or outsourcing, with production taking place either in the North or the
South. An important role is played by the proximity of production of the two inputs. If both inputs
are produced in the North, the organizational form (whether vertical integration or outsourcing) is
made irrelevant due to the assumption that quality-contingent contracts can be enforced ex-post. By
contrast, if production is split between the North and the South, quality-contingent contracts are not
enforceable and the party’s bargain over the surplus on the basis of an incomplete contracting model
that is similar to Antràs (2003).
Product cycles arise from the incomplete nature of international contracts in the South and
from a decline in the importance (reduction in output elasticity) of the high-tech input with the age
or maturity of the good. Since incomplete contracts reduce product development, goods are initially
manufactured in the North where contracting is efficient. Manufacture of the low-tech input is later
shifted to the South to take advantage of the lower wage. Conditions are specified under which this
shift to the South occurs first within the boundaries of the firm through FDI and, at a later stage,
through outsourcing to independent firms in the South. The general equilibrium model demonstrates18
that incomplete contracting in the South leads to an equilibrium wage that is higher in the North than
the South. 
In the three papers discussed in this subsection, a final-good producer controls the choice of
organizational form and also provides an input (capital in Antràs, 2003, headquarter services in
Antràs and Helpman, 2004 and a hi-tech input in Antràs, 2005). Production also requires a second,
intermediate input or component that can be manufactured by a manager under vertical integration
or outsourced to an independent firm. Because the full cost of production of the intermediate input
is assumed to be relationship specific and non-contractible, the intermediate-good producer (whether
a manager or a firm) determines the quantity supplied. Output of the final good is then jointly
determined by the quantities of inputs supplied by the two parties based on various formulations of
production functions (mostly Cobb Douglas). This is a useful and elegantly simple way to specify
the contributions of both parties. However, since the two parties contribute so as to jointly determine
output and are compensated through lump-sum payment of a share of the revenue as in the above
papers, this model of outsourcing may better describe a joint venture rather than an arm’s length
relationship. In typical arm’s length contracts, transactions occur at a positive price and the buyer has
an opportunity to order more components as desired.
3.2. Incentive systems versus property rights 
Rather than ex-post bargaining after investment has been sunk, an incentive systems approach
involves optimal incentive contracts designed by a principal to induce investment or effort by
managers. The first best level of effort is typically not achieved due to the inability to observe effort
and imperfect monitoring. Since vertical integration is assumed to reduce the cost of monitoring, it
is possible that vertical integration is preferred to arm’s length contracting even if the property rights14In both cases, the contract involves an up-front payment plus a bonus on successful delivery. 
15The ordering is not determined by the size of fixed costs (as in Antràs and Helpman, 2004)
because the effort of the agent varies depending on who is responsible for the fixed costs. 
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approach would suggest outsourcing due to the importance of the agent’s effort to overall surplus.
Grossman and Helpman (2004) take an incentive systems approach to explore the tradeoff
between vertical integration and international outsourcing. A principal can manufacture a given
quantity of a final good if she can obtain the necessary intermediate good from an agent. Delivery
requires that the agent be successful in multiple tasks, where the probability of delivery is increasing
in the effort of the agent as in Holstrom and Milgrom (1991). The effort of the agent can be perfectly
monitored for some fraction of the many tasks (ensuring success is those tasks) within a vertically
integrated firm, but cannot be monitored if the agent is an independent contractor.
14 However,
independent contractors, but not internal managers, are responsible for the up-front cost of inputs and
are out-of pocket in the event production is not successful. Consequently, there is a tradeoff between
greater monitoring under vertical integration and higher-powered incentives for effort under
outsourcing. 
There are two countries, North and South. Differentiated final-goods are produced only in the
North, but the intermediate good can be produced in both countries. The principal has a greater ability
to monitor managerial effort under vertical integration in the North than through FDI in the South,
but there is an advantage from production in the South due to exogenously lower costs. As in Melitz
(2003), productivity varies across final-good producers with the more productive firms earning higher
revenues. The ranking of organizational forms from highest to lowest productivity is illustrated
Figure 2 (above) in the column under AH(04).
15 At the highest productivity levels, production is
outsourced to the South because the principal is willing to pay so as to make success a certainty, but20
pays less under outsourcing because the up-front costs of production are shifted to the independent
contractor. As productivity decreases, the preferred organizational form becomes vertical integration
in the North, then FDI and again outsourcing in the South. At low productivity levels, the lower cost
in the South and higher level of effort made by independent contractors is needed to make production
viable. It is never profitable to outsource in the North. Since the ordering of organizational forms in
terms of final-good productivity in Grossman and Helpman (2004) differs substantially from Antràs
and Helpman (2004), it would seem that, like a number of results that draw from models of industrial
organization, the outcome is highly sensitive to the model.
The final paper in this group, Feenstra and Hanson (2003b), contrasts the implications of both
the property rights and incentive systems approaches for the ownership and control structure of firms
engaged in the export processing trade from China. Production can involve pure-assembly in which
a foreign buyer of the processed good both owns and supplies the inputs required for processing or
import and assembly in which the processing plant is responsible for finding and purchasing the
imported inputs. The processing plant itself can be foreign or locally owned. Under a range of
parameter values, the property rights version of the model predicts that ownership and control should
be split, by giving the local manager control rights over the input so as to increase his effort. By
contrast, if managerial rewards can be tailored to effort through monitoring as in the incentive
systems model, then it is more efficient to allocate both ownership and control the foreign firm. Based
on four-digit SITC product data for the years 1997 - 1999 for processing exports from China and
detailed data as to firm type, the paper provides support for the property rights approach by showing
that the most common organizational form is to combine at least partial foreign ownership with the
purchase of inputs controlled by the factory management.16McLaren (1999) considers incomplete contracts in a similar setting and discusses the potential
effects of differences in contracting across countries, but trade is not modeled.
17In bidding models, price is determined by the value of the good in its most attractive alternative
use, which implies a zero price for a fully specialized input. Thus in McLaren (2000), unintegrated
suppliers choose to use a “flexible technology” that is of less value to the primary buyer, but increases the
probability of an outside buyer. By contrast, Nash bargaining would allow a firm supplying a fully
specialized input to receive a share of the rents created by the relationship. 
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4. The thickness of the market and the outsourcing decision
This section discusses the three papers, McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2005), that emphasize the importance of the “thickness of the market” in determining the probability
that final-good firms and suppliers of specialized inputs find an appropriate match so that investment
and production can take place. In keeping with simple transaction cost models, there are fixed costs
of vertical integration and, in Grossman and Helpman (2002), higher marginal costs, but otherwise
the internal operation of firm is left as an efficient black box. The choice between vertical integration
and domestic outsourcing is considered in 4.1, whereas 4.2 focuses on the choice between domestic
and international outsourcing.
 4.1. Vertical integration versus domestic outsourcing
In McLaren (2000), final-good firms can obtain a specialized, indivisible input either through
the market based on a bidding model or through “integrated” procurement in which the firm merges
with a supplier.
16 Since the disadvantage from merger is simply a fixed cost, the model follows the
“transaction cost” approach to the theory of the firm. Unintegrated suppliers face a hold-up problem
since the inability to observe quality ex ante implies that bidding takes place only after suppliers have
sunk their costs.
17 
For independent suppliers, the probability of an attractive outside buyer is increasing in the
“thickness of the market” as determined by the number of unintegrated final-good producers. Since22
vertical integration reduces the number of unintegrated firms, there is a negative externality from
vertical integration that makes arm’s-length arrangements less attractive. Multiple equilibria are
possible. Since the opening of countries to trade increases the number of available unintegrated firms,
trade serves to thicken the market and raise welfare. Also procurement systems across countries tend
to converge as transport costs fall. McLaren (2000) provides a rich formulation of the role of the
thickness of markets, but since countries differ only in their numbers of integrated and unintegrated
producers and the choice of organizational form matters only for fixed costs, the paper abstracts from
effects on final-good output and also from features of general equilibrium trade models such as
differences in factor endowments. 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) builds on the ideas in McLaren (2000), but the choice between
vertical integration and outsourcing is developed in a general equilibrium, monopolistic competitive
framework in which final-good industries differ in the degree of product differentiation. However,
the closed economy setting precludes consideration of international outsourcing. The costs from
search for a partner under outsourcing are counterbalanced by higher fixed and marginal costs under
vertical integration. Similar to McLaren (2000), the benefit of a “thicker” market makes outsourcing
more viable in large economies or large industries. Also, equilibrium involves either vertical
integration by all producers or outsourcing by all producers. Arm’s length sales are made through
incomplete contracts rather than bidding. As a result, the cost of production of the specialized (or
partially specialized) component is sunk prior to bargaining. Since payment takes the form of a share
of the profits, components are purchased at zero marginal cost. Final-good output is limited by the18In the version of the model in which intermediate-good producers can choose the degree to
which they specialize their components, final-good firms face marginal adaptation costs so as to make the
components “fit”. These costs reduce equilibrium output.
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number of components that intermediate good producers choose to supply.
18 
An interesting question is the role of the intensity of competition in shaping organizational
form. Although the effects of variation in the degree of substitutability between final products are
complex, for the case in which consumer products are highly substitutable, outsourcing occurs only
if specialized producers have a large per-unit cost advantage.
4.2. Domestic versus international outsourcing
Grossman and Helpman (2005) develops the choice between domestic and international
outsourcing under incomplete contracts in a general equilibrium setting of monopolistic competition
and trade. Differentiated final goods are designed and produced only in the North, but for production
to take place, each final-good firm must find an independent supplier in the North or the South
willing to customize and produce a specialized component. Vertical integration is not considered.
Labor is the only factor of production and the South is favored by a lower wage. Consistency with
general equilibrium wage determination and balanced trade is maintained by assuming that a
homogeneous final good is produced only in the South.
Final-good producers are represented as being located symmetrically around a unit circle in
terms of the specialized component that they require, whereas suppliers are located on the circle
based on their particular expertise. Final-good firms incur a fixed cost of search, but since component
suppliers incur higher fixed costs of entry and investment, there are fewer firms producing
components than final goods in both the North and the South. As a result, each supplier generally
provides components for more than one final-good producer and the “thickness of the market” is24
defined by the number of component producers. 
Unlike Grossman and Helpman (2002) where final-good producers had to customize
components to make them fit, in Grossman and Helpman (2005), suppliers invest so as to develop
a prototype component that is an exact fit. The required relationship-specific investment is increasing
in the distance between the supplier’s expertise and the final producer’s input needs. There is a
positive feedback between entry by component producers, which thickens the market, and the extent
of search by final-good producers, but increases in the wage limit the extent of entry. Multiple
equilibria with different patterns of outsourcing are a possibility. As might be expected, economies
with a greater endowment of labor tend to have thicker markets (more component producers), which
favors outsourcing in those markets. However, other results driven by complex general equilibrium
responses affecting wages and the numbers of each type of firm are not obvious. In particular,
increasing returns in outsourcing are sufficiently strong that an expansion in Southern labor supply
actually reduces the wage gap between the North and the South. Also, an improvement in a country’s
legal environment (which makes a larger fraction of relationship-specific investment contractible)
increases the country’s share of outsourcing holding the wage and number of firms fixed; but general
equilibrium responses to a global improvement favor outsourcing in the North.
Due to an inability to write contracts on the full amount of investment, suppliers are
compensated through a share of profits, which are assumed to be disbursed as lump-sum payments.
Components are purchased at marginal cost through an efficient order contract. These assumptions
simplify the analysis by abstracting from any direct connection between relationship-specific
investment and the output of each final-good firm. Also, as explained in the next section, real world
requirements for the international delivery of goods make such pricing schemes hard to implement.19This two part pricing scheme could be implemented through the use of a schedule of prices in
which the fixed payment is included in the price of the first unit or spread over other inframarginal units.
However, rather than a schedule in which different units have different prices, quantity discounting
typically involves a reduction in the price per unit with the purchase of a larger quantity.
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5. Practical requirements for customs and payment on delivery
Simply crossing borders complicates the nature of transactions. First there is the significant
problem of guaranteeing payment across national borders. Typically the seller first issues a pro forma
invoice, which contains information such as quantity or volume as well as price, insurance and
shipping costs. The buyer then uses the invoice to arrange for funds, usually through a letter of credit,
which is an undertaking by the buyer’s bank to pay the seller’s bank only after documents have been
presented certifying that the specified goods have been delivered. The actual transaction is governed
by a commercial invoice or contract. The information concerning price, quantity and value cannot
deviate very much from the information in the letter of credit. For insurance and customs purposes,
it is also important that the value of the goods as stated on the commercial invoice represents the full
value of the goods.
The papers in groups 1 and 2 (sections 3 and 4) all assume that components produced under
incomplete contracts are purchased through a single lump-sum payment or a combination of a lump-
sum payment and a price set at marginal-cost.
19 Such contracts have useful efficiency properties, but
are not typical of arm’s length contracts within a country and seem particularly unrealistic in an
international trading context. As mentioned above, the total payment for the good, including any
fixed payment, needs to be listed on the commercial invoice or letter of credit for insurance and
customs purposes. Customs officials would view shipments listed as having zero value (with a lump
sum paid through other means) as particularly suspicious. Full disclosure of the terms of the contract
also facilitates payment to the supplier on delivery and, if that fails, a better prospect of a successful20The difficulty in enforcing payments across borders also suggests the importance of the trust
generated by business and social networks. See Rauch (2001) for a survey.
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appeal to the courts. In addition, the specification of a price protects the buyer from having to pay
the full amount for incomplete shipments. 
Contracts where intermediate goods are priced at marginal cost are efficient in that they avoid
the loss in output arising from “double-marginalization”, which arises when the mark-up of the
intermediate-good producer is included in price and hence in the marginal cost of the final-good
producer. Such contracts are also convenient for modeling purposes since they can justify output
levels that are independent of organizational form. However, the practical difficulties discussed above
suggest that the inefficiency stemming from “double marginalization” should be viewed as a normal
consequence of arm’s length international outsourcing that would not apply to transactions within
vertically integrated firms.
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6. Contractual versus generic outsourcing 
The third group of papers, namely, Spencer and Qiu (2001), Qiu and Spencer (2002), Head,
Ries and Spencer (2004) and Feenstra and Spencer (2005), involve a tradeoff between the purchase
of specialized components or parts under incomplete contracts and the purchase of standard or
generic parts from a spot market. This tradeoff is built into the contracting process: in bargaining with
a supplier that has invested so as to specialize an input, the outside option of the final-good producer
is to purchase a generic part. 
Rather than requiring just one customized component, the final-good is assembled using a
variety or range of parts in fixed proportion. Relationship-specific investment or RSI by a supplier21 In Spencer and Qiu (2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002), RSI is more productive if it is applied
to a part that is responsible for a greater share of the cost of assembly. In Head, Ries and Spencer (2004)
and Feenstra and Spencer (2005), an exogenously given parameter captures productivity across parts.
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reduces the marginal cost of assembly by improving the fit of the particular part with the other parts
used in production.
21 Since it is not possible to contract on the level of RSI, each supplier shares in
the economic rent from the relationship through Nash bargaining after investment is sunk. As a result,
suppliers undertake too little RSI and too many parts are purchased as generics. Since the parties
bargain over price and lump sum transfers are ruled out, the price of each part includes a mark-up to
cover the supplier’s share of profits. As a result, “double marginalization” reduces final-good output
relative to an efficient contract in which price is set at marginal cost and profit is transferred through
lump-sum payments. However price contracts may better reflect practical realities as discussed in
Section 5. The final-good producer determines whether to bargain with a supplier, the quantity of
parts to order and the output of the final good.
Parts are ordered on a continuum based on increasing productivity of relationship-specific
investment. Since there is an endogenously determined cut-off in the productivity of investment
below which parts are produced as generics, the size of the network of suppliers undertaking RSI is
determined endogenously. Also, a greater scale of final-good production increases investment by
suppliers, which, in turn, feeds back to reduce the marginal cost of final-good production and raise
output. The theory abstracts from general equilibrium effects working through factor prices and
consumer demand for variety, but the simpler partial equilibrium formulation facilitates consideration
of a number of policy issues.
Figure 3 illustrates various options for contractual outsourcing by a Northern final-good
producer as well as the possibility of buying a generic version from a spot market. Spencer and Qiu28
(2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002) consider only two of the options in Figure 3: contractual
outsourcing to a Northern firm that undertakes RSI and production in the North and the import of
generic parts from the South. Proximity of suppliers to the final-good producer is important for RSI
due to the need for information. Parts with a higher productivity of investment (those involving a
higher proportion of the cost of the final-good) are produced at home and the less important parts are
imported as generics. Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) add the possibility (not shown in the Figure)
that final-good firms producing abroad through FDI differentially source components from their
home network of suppliers.
Figure 3: Forms of contractual and generic outsourcing
In Feenstra and Spencer (2005), the final-good firm in the North chooses between all four
organizational forms shown in Figure 3. Northern suppliers can take advantage of proximity by
undertaking RSI in the North, but can produce more cheaply in the South by incurring a fixed cost
for FDI. The Northern final-good firm can also directly contract with suppliers in the South, who29
undertake RSI. The ranking of the four outsourcing options from high to low productivity of RSI is
shown in Figure 3. At the highest productivity levels, both RSI and production takes place in the
North. As productivity decreases, Northern suppliers shift production, but not RSI, to the South; then
Southern suppliers undertake both RSI and production in the South; finally parts are imported as
generics from a spot market in the South. The ordering of organizational forms is again different from
the orderings based on final-good productivity as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Spencer and Qiu (2001) and Qiu and Spencer (2002) consider the role of vertical keiretsu
(Japanese vertical corporate groups) for trade with Japan. The papers focus on the auto industry,
where the limited value and range of parts imported by keiretsu, such as Toyota and Nissan, led to
claims by the US and other countries in the mid 1990s of an “unfair” trade barrier arising from
Japanese business practices. Spencer and Qiu (2001) argues that Japanese business practices
involving outsourcing to keiretsu suppliers under incomplete contracts could create the impression
of a trade barrier, even when none exists. For example, the benefits of RSI could make it profitable
for a range of parts to be procured locally in Japan even though these parts are produced at a marginal
cost that exceeds the import price. Qiu and Spencer (2002) consider the effects of policies aimed at
opening the Japanese markets for intermediate goods, either through requiring that Japan increase
the market share of imported components, such as auto parts, through a VIE (voluntary import
expansion) or limit its exports of final-goods, such as autos, through a VER (voluntary export
restraint). Although both policies would cause Japan to import a wider range of parts, the associated
fall in keiretsu investment and output could actually reduce the total value of Japanese imports. 
Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) develops an empirical specification of Spencer and Qiu (2001)
to investigate the role of vertical networks in international trade by examining the pattern of US auto30
parts exports to 26 countries from 1989-1994. The paper develops a number of proxies for network
strength at the auto-parts level (for 53 parts classifications) so as to identify the parts likely to be
produced within the network and those likely to be outsourced as generic versions. The most
interesting proxy measures the intensity of keiretsu involvement in the production of each part based
on the fraction of keiretsu suppliers used for each part by each Japanese automaker. As predicted by
the model, US exports to Japan tend to be lower for parts with a greater intensity of keiretsu
involvement. Although differences in keiretsu strength are significant for the composition of Japanese
parts imports, after controlling for automaker scale and other country characteristics, such as distance
from the US, the paper finds that Japan’s aggregate import levels are not outliers. 
Other results also underscore the importance of vertical networks in trade. Countries with a
greater output per automaker import fewer parts per car, which fits with the model’s prediction that
a greater scale of production increases the incentive for RSI by local suppliers. Also, the hypothesis
that the Big 3 US automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, now Daimler Chrysler) operate
with networks of US based suppliers is supported by the finding that countries with a larger Big 3
presence tend to import more parts from the US for each car produced. In addition, countries whose
foreign affiliates employ more automotive sector workers in the US, tend to import more US auto
parts per car, presumably from these affiliates.
Feenstra and Spencer (2005) argue that a reduction in the marginal costs of production and
transport should increase the range or variety of intermediate goods exported from the South through
FDI by shifting production away from suppliers in the North. Such a reduction in cost should have
no effect on the goods that are exported based on outsourcing contracts or spot market purchases. The
paper examines this hypothesis using data from Chinese provinces to a large number of export22There is a continuum of buyers each with a preferred specification for an input represented by a
point on a circle, but only a finite number of suppliers choose to enter the industry. Buyers can reduce
price under outsourcing by investing so as to increase the flexibility of their input requirements.
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destinations for the period 1988-2000. Transportation costs are proxied by two measures of distance:
the internal distance from the province to the nearest shipping port or major border crossing and then
the external distance from that port/border crossing to the destination country. Based on a gravity
equation specification in which the extensive margin, representing the range of goods, is used as the
dependent variable, the impact of external distance is insignificant in most cases, but internal
distance tends to have a greater impact in reducing the variety of processing exports by foreign
owned enterprises than domestically owned firms.
Chen and Feenstra (2005) is also concerned with the correspondence between variety in
intermediate goods and the vertical structure of international trade. However, since relationship-
specific investments are made by buyers rather than the suppliers, the property rights approach
suggests vertical integration rather than contractual outsourcing. Buyers that do not make a specific
investment to match with a particular supplier, purchase the input at a price determined by Bertrand
competition between the two closest suppliers.
22 Multiple equilibria in the variety of intermediate
goods is a possibility. Thus the observation in Feenstra, Yang and Hamilton (1999) that South Korea
exports a limited variety of goods compared with Taiwan could be an example of this phenomena.
Based on data for a broad sample of countries, the paper finds moderate support for its prediction that
industries with fewer suppliers and hence less variety in intermediate goods are associated with more
vertical integration and more intrafirm trade. 23Following Cabellero and Hammour (1998), two goods are produced with labor or capital alone
and a third mixed good, M, uses capital and labor in fixed proportion. Incomplete contracts lead to too
little capital investment in M, but workers share in the rents arising from the restriction in output. Higher
quality institutions reduce the fraction of capital subject to incomplete contracts.
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7. Institutions and enforcement of contracts.
There is a growing literature attesting to the importance of the quality of a country’s
institutions for comparative advantage and the volume of trade. For example, Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) finds that economic predation at the border due to corrupt institutions acts as a
hidden tax on trade. Costinot (2004) develops an appealing model in which firms producing more
complex goods (defined as the number of elementary tasks that must be performed to produce one
unit) are larger due to greater gains from the division of labor, but are also more dependent on the
ability of a country’s institutions to enforce labor contracts within the firm. A higher quality of
institutions increases the size of firms and also leads to specialization in more complex goods with
the opening of trade. The papers, Levchenko (2004) and Nunn (2005), both involve incomplete
contracts for specialized inputs.
Levchenko (2004) argues that it matters for the gains from trade whether institutional
differences between countries are reflected in differences in the quality of contract enforcement or,
as is usually assumed, in differences in productivity. There are “good jobs” in contract intensive
sectors, since the property rights approach implies that workers earn rents from ex-post bargaining
with the owners of capital.
23 If contract enforcement is better in the North than the South, then the
“good jobs” will shift to the North with the opening of trade. As a result, the South tends to gain less
than the North from trade and may actually be worse off. By contrast, if the workers in the Northern
institutionally dependent sector are simply more productive, closing down this sector enhances the
Southern gains from trade. Using data on 1998 US imports classified by industry and country of33
origin, Levchenko (2004) supports this analysis with evidence that better institutional quality tends
to increase the extent to which a country exports goods in industries that are contract intensive.
Nunn (2005) provides additional theory and evidence that countries with a better ability to
enforce contracts have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that are contract-
intensive. Final goods, which are produced with both customized and standardized inputs in fixed
proportion, are ordered on a continuum in terms of increasing importance of the customized input,
which requires relationship-specific investment. The proportion of contracts that are enforced
depends on the quality of the legal system. Using 1997 export data for 146 countries disaggregated
into 223 industries, differences in judicial quality prove significant in explaining differences across
country pairs in the value of exports of contract-intensive goods.
8. The theory of delegation of authority
Aghion and Tirole (1997) develops the conditions under which formal authority over the
choice between a number of competing projects will be delegated to an agent (A-formal authority),
or retained by the principal (P-formal authority). Each party can increase the probability that they
privately learn the payoffs from the projects by exerting effort. Delegation of authority fosters the
agent’s incentive to acquire information, but it also involves a potentially costly loss of control for
the principal since an informed agent will choose a project partly based on private benefits (perks).
If neither party becomes informed, both parties are worse off since no project is implemented. Formal
authority (the right to decide) is distinguished from real authority (effective control). If the principal
is not informed (perhaps due to little effort) but retains formal authority, she gives up real authority
by rubber stamping the agent’s proposal. Unlike models involving monitoring of an agent’s effort,24If the costs of adaptation are low, then the innovative efforts of the principal and agent are
highly “substitutable” and control is delegated to the agent. At lower levels of substitutability, the
principal retains control over implementation, but it is possible that the agent makes no innovative effort.
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greater effort by the principal tends to reduce effort by the agent. 
Puga and Trefler (2002) is concerned with the implications for organizational form of the
tension between creating incremental improvements in knowledge and controlling the
implementation of those improvements. Similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997), the allocation of control
to an agent (outsourcing) acts as an incentive device to induce effort, but it also imposes a cost on
the principal due to a conflict as to the appropriate blueprint. Since an innovation in one component
requires adaptation in other components, the principal prefers a blueprint that shifts the costs of
adaptation onto the agent and vice versa.
24 The non-appropriability of knowledge is also important:
if an agent creates knowledge, there is some probability that a court will award all the profits to the
agent. An appealing feature of the paper is its use of real world illustrations, such as Sony’s decision
to become more integrated so as to retain control over the adaptation of television components to fit
with flat screen displays.
Marin and Verdier (2002, 2003, 2005) are interested in explaining the recent trend towards
a “flatter hierarchy” in which power is delegated to lower level management. Both papers model
delegation as in Aghion and Tirole (1977), but the competing “projects” are given a specific
interpretation as reflecting different methods of production, where the method preferred by the agent
(manager) confers private benefits at the expense of a higher marginal cost. There are three
organizational forms: centralized control by the principal (P-organization or integration), delegation
to the agent (A-organization or outsourcing), and the single managed firm (O-organization) with no25If the principal’s benefit from successful production is low, she chooses P as she makes only a
low effort that does not stifle the initiative (effort) of the agent. At intermediate benefit levels, the
principal chooses A to increase the agent’s initiative. At high benefit levels, the principal’s effort is
sufficiently high to stifle the effort by the agent, even under delegation of power, and O is the outcome.
26Marin and Verdier (2005) show that firms in Austria (the smaller country) have greater
centralization in internal decision making than do firms in Germany. 
27Assuming independent retailers (or alternatively producers of an input) are more efficient in
creating quality than the manufacturer, de Bettignies (2004) uses a property rights approach to show that
outsourcing is the response to greater substitutability of goods as consumer travel costs fall. Firms choose
the same organizational form if competition is high or low, but not at intermediate levels of competition.
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internal hierarchy, since the agent exerts minimal effort.
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To examine the effects of competition, Marin and Verdier (2002) embed their model of the
firm into a general equilibrium monopolisitic competition framework in which labor is the only factor
of production. At intermediate levels of competition, as modeled by the degree of substitutability of
goods, there is a tendency to move to a flatter hierarchy (from P to A) so as to increase the effort of
the agent. Multiple equilibria arise in general equilibrium from the dependence of the organizational
decision of any one firm on the organizational forms of other firms. Thus two otherwise identical
countries might have different corporate cultures in the absence of trade (either an A or a P) . Due
to convergence of organizational form, the move to an integrated world economy can lead to waves
of outsourcing, but the outcome is indeterminate since market size per se has no effect on the
organization of the firm. With the introduction of profit mark-ups that vary with market competition,
Marin and Verdier (2005) show that very large and very small countries will have integrated
corporate organizations, while countries of middle size will outsource.
26 Toughness of competition
eventually leads to outsourcing. It is interesting that an increase in competition also leads to
outsourcing in the different context of Bertrand competition between two manufacturers located at
each end of a Hotelling line (de Bettignies, 2004).
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Marin and Verdier (2003) extend the analysis to a two-sector, two-factor model in which two
countries, the North and the South, differ in the skill intensity of their workers. As the ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor increases, the organizational form tends to move from P to A and then to O. If firms
in the skill-rich North choose P and firms in the skill-poor South choose O prior to the opening of
trade, then a move to the integrated world economy can result in a wave of outsourcing as firms shift
to the intermediate A organization, involving delegation of power. Since a flatter hierarchy is
associated with a greater demand for skill, there is an associated “war for talent”. 
9. Where are we now and where should we go? 
In examining where we are now, it is useful to first summarize the role of the different
underlying theories in driving the choice between outsourcing and vertical integration. Under the
property rights approach, relationship-specific investments are distorted regardless of organizational
form. The incentive to outsource is increased if component suppliers are more important in creating
surplus than final-good producers. The models of Antràs (2003, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004)
and Feenstra and Hanson (2003b) illustrate this theme in different contexts. Investment or effort
levels are also distorted under the incentive systems approach, but the distortion is lower inside the
firm than under arm’s length relationships due to better monitoring. The advantage from vertical
integration is potentially offset by higher powered incentives under outsourcing (Grossman and
Helpman, 2004). The theory of delegation of authority involves a tradeoff for the principal between
maintaining control under vertical integration and increasing the agent’s effort under outsourcing.
Moderate levels of competition or moderate skill intensity of the workforce leads to a flatter hierarchy
(Marin and Verdier, 2002, 2003, 2005). Finally, under the transaction-cost approach taken by papers37
concerned with the “thickness of markets”, matching between independent firms is costly, but vertical
integration has higher fixed (and possibly variable) costs (McLaren, 2000 and Grossman and
Helpman, 2002). The fact that the various theories differ significantly means that there is no
overarching explanation for outsourcing. 
There are three primary explanations for a reliance on international outsourcing to procure
specialized inputs, rather than domestic production through outsourcing or vertical integration: (1)
lower costs of foreign production; (2) improvements in foreign institutions or international
communications; (3) reduced costs of international transactions, which is associated with
globalization or greater integration in world markets.
Lower costs of foreign production as in (1) are highly important empirically as emphasized
in the business press and, as can be seen from Table 1 in section 2, also drive much of the theory. In
particular, if the theory incorporates a higher cost for international transactions, some offsetting
benefit from foreign production is needed to induce international outsourcing. The main source of
lower costs is lower wages, but the effect of physical distance is also important. A low cost country
should export a greater variety of intermediate goods to physically closer countries (Feenstra and
Spencer, 2005). As for (2), the quality of foreign enforcement of contracts is important (Antràs, 2005,
Grossman and Helpman, 2005, Levchenko, 2004 and Nunn, 2005). However, factors that reduce the
size of any informational disadvantage in investment from the location of a supplier in a different
country from the buyer also play a role (better communication technology in Feenstra and Spencer,
2005, networks of suppliers in Head, Ries and Spencer, 2004). 
The literature identifies a variety of reasons for a reduction in the cost of international
transactions and hence greater international outsourcing under (3). These include (i) a reduction in38
trade barriers such as tariffs and (ii) reduced costs of international search and matching leading to
entry by suppliers and thicker markets (Grossman and Helpman, 2005). At the extreme, the costs of
international transactions may be reduced to zero leading to a fully integrated world economy as in
standard models of international trade. Global integration per se, interpreted as a move from autarchy
to an integrated would economy, leads to further reasons for outsourcing under (3): (iii) thicker
markets due to the combining of economies (McLaren, 2000); (iv) the convergence of organizational
form to outsourcing when multiple equilibria are possible (Marin and Verdier, 2002, 2003) and (v)
differences in factor endowments across countries (capital intensity in Antràs, 2003, skill intensity
in Marin and Verdier, 2003, and a greater labor endowment, which raises the thickness of the market
in Grossman and Helpman, 2005). 
Since many of the just described conditions driving international outsourcing would also
enhance the profitability of foreign direct investment, it is important to identify features that
distinguish these two organizational forms. Features that favor international outsourcing relative to
FDI include: (1) higher fixed costs of FDI (Antràs and Helpman, 2004, Feenstra and Spencer, 2005);
(2) shift of up-front costs of production from final-good firms to component suppliers (Grossman and
Helpman, 2004); (3) differences in productivity of final-good firms (moderate productivity firms
outsource and the highest productivity firms engage in FDI in Antràs and Helpman, 2004, but both
the lowest and highest productivity firms outsource in Grossman and Helpman, 2004); (3) low
productivity of relationship-specific investment by component suppliers (contractual outsourcing at
the upper end of the range and import of generics at the bottom in Feenstra and Spencer, 2005); (4)
lower capital intensity in intermediate-good production (Antràs, 2003); (5) a greater geographic
distance (reduces FDI, but not contractual outsourcing or generic outsourcing in Feenstra and39
Spencer, 2005).
In exploring the conditions leading to international outsourcing under incomplete contracts,
a major achievement has been to embed contracting models into the standard general equilibrium
models that explain trade based on differences in endowments of factors across countries and
monopolistic competition arising from consumer demand for variety. In particular, it is a very nice
contribution to use differences in factor proportions across countries to explain not only the factor
intensity of a country’s exports, but also the organizational form of production (Antràs, 2003). Papers
that explore the role of the thickness of markets already have a general equilibrium character due to
the feedback between the ease of search as affected by the thickness of the market and decisions by
individual firms as to organizational form. The extension to monopolistic competition and a general
equilibrium model of trade adds significant complexity. Given the need to model the thickness in
both a domestic and foreign market taking into account general equilibrium changes in the wage, it
is not surprising that Grossman and Helpman (2004) sacrificed consideration of vertical integration.
Also, although relationship-specific investment is distorted by incomplete contracts, the international
order contracts for the components themselves are assumed to involve efficient purchase at marginal
cost. Indeed, much of the literature takes a highly simplified approach to the modeling of incomplete
contracts by assuming that specialized components are purchased at a zero price with payment
through lump-sum distributions of profit. 
In looking to the future, I would suggest that greater attention be paid to the types of
transaction costs observed in international arm’s length contracts, including the costs of ensuring
payment across international borders, which can vary based on the quality of institutions. Recognition
that outsourcing contracts typically involve a strictly positive price that exceeds marginal cost,28See Reuters (2004) for discussion of the implications of tight visa rules for US business. 
29See Solomon et al. (2004) for the sale by General Electric of its global business-processing
operations in India to independent firms in an effort to cuts costs and streamline its business. 
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whereas internal transactions within vertically integrated firms do not, would help to further
distinguish these organizational forms. However, the use of a price-markup to compensate for
relationship-specific investment provides a link between the level of investment and final-good
output, which can add significantly to the complexity of the model.
Adding complexity to the model of incomplete contracts through the inclusion of price effects
may require some sacrifice elsewhere, such as the omission of a general equilibrium determination
of the wage, but, in any case, I would expect to see more consideration of partial equilibrium models
so as to focus on the policy implications of international outsourcing. One issue is the policies that
a country may take to reduce the ability of its firms to outsource internationally. For example, during
the 2004 US election campaign, when fears of international outsourcing reached fever pitch, there
were suggestions that the US should tighten visa restrictions so as to reduce the ability of companies
to train foreign software engineers in preparation for international outsourcing.
28 Presumably policies
in developing countries towards multinational firms would also influence the relative importance of
FDI and international contractual outsourcing.
Another promising direction for research is to recognize that many of the firms involved in
international contractual outsourcing, such as IBM and General Electric, are extremely large and have
some market power.
29 This suggests a need to understand the strategic motives of oligopolistic firms
that engage in international contractual outsourcing. One potentially important issue is the ability of
firms to protect proprietary information from their rivals. There is also the more general issue of
ensuring data security and protection of information when firms outsource in locations such as China30See Solomon (2004) for proposed legislation to regulate the processing of sensitive financial
and medical information in countries such as India. 
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that are known for producing cheap imitations of branded goods.
30
I would suggest two main lines for further empirical research. First, thicker markets and better
institutions for the enforcement of contracts in foreign countries are both appealing explanations for
greater international outsourcing. There is already some empirical support for the importance of
country-specific differences in the quality of enforcement of contracts (Levchenko, 2004 and Nunn,
2005). However, since better institutions can also increase the thickness of markets, there is a need
to exploit predictions that distinguish between the two theories. To establish the role of search and
matching, one possibility is to relate the thickness of markets to the size of a country’s skilled
workforce, or even better, a direct measure of the number of independent suppliers of a particular
intermediate good. 
Second, there are likely payoffs from further empirical analysis of the relationship between
the range or variety of traded intermediate goods and the choice of organizational form. The new
theories of trade and organizational form emphasize the prevalence or range of firms choosing each
organizational form, rather than the value or volume of trade that was the focus of traditional trade
models. Feenstra and Spencer (2005) makes a start by examining whether a gravity type model can
explain the variety of intermediate goods that are produced under contractual outsourcing, rather than
through FDI or ordinary trade. However, the predictions of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and
Grossman and Helpman (2004) that relate the range of products produced under each organizational
forms to firm level productivity have yet to be tested. Since both the theory and empirical work is in
its infancy, we can expect very rich further developments.42
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